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Kelo v. City of New London: New Jersey’s
Take on Takings
The Honorable Peter G. Sheridan ∗

INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court set off a firestorm of controversy last summer when it permitted condemnation of homes in the
1
Fort Trumbull area of New London, Connecticut. In broad terms,
Kelo v. City of New London stands for the seemingly innocuous proposition that the government may condemn a property for economic de2
velopment purposes. Justice O’Connor’s dissent lit up the newspapers with her conclusion that “[n]othing is to prevent the State from
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz Carlton, any home with a shopping
3
mall, or any farm with a factory.” She found that there was no
4
longer any reasonable “constraint” upon the use of eminent domain.
The average American was jolted by the decision because Ameri5
can families believe that their homes are sacrosanct (“a man’s home
is his castle”), and vitally important because they are a major asset to
the family. In basic civics courses, Americans learn that private property interests are protected from the government’s reach except in
6
extraordinary circumstances. In addition, Americans take pride in
∗
United States District Judge, District of New Jersey. Formerly of Graham, Curtin & Sheridan. Thank you to my assistant, Harriett Tyrrell, for her assistance with
this Article.
1
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
2
Id. at 2668–69.
3
Id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
4
Id. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor believes that the result of the Kelo decision is to delete “for public use” from the Takings Clause. Id. at
2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
5
See Jon Gertner, Chasing Ground, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 16, 2005, at 46, 52;
see generally Jesse Holland, New London Woman Asks Congress to Step Into Eminent Domain
Case, NEWSDAY.COM, Sept. 21, 2005 (on file with author).
6
Property rights were recognized far before the birth of the United States, but
the Constitution secures them for certain. Madison said “[g]overnment is instituted
to protect property of every sort. . . . This being the end of government, that alone is
a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.”
James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 14 PAPERS OF
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their homes and their communities. Most Americans are unaware of
the broad reach of the power of eminent domain. They do not realize that government may uproot a family for economic development
purposes. One Congressperson summed up the feelings of most citizens by referring to the implications of the Kelo decision as “the most
7
un-American thing that can be done.” This sentiment conflicts with
the need for redevelopment in many American cities.
Kelo was another split decision (5–4), which has become commonplace in recent years due to the differing constitutional views of
8
the Justices. Rather than settling the law of eminent domain, the
split decision has stimulated a lively debate over its boundaries and
basic foundations. At least twenty-five states are considering legislative initiatives to curb the use of eminent domain because of the Kelo
9
decision. With a new Chief Justice at the helm, and another new
member recently appointed, the issue will in all probability be re10
litigated before the Supreme Court of the United States. Due to the
public outcry, the decision has resuscitated a narrower definition of
the phrase “for public use,” which at least one legal commentator had
11
pronounced dead more than fifty years ago!
This paper will examine the public use requirement in light of
the Kelo decision, with particular emphasis in Part II on its effect on
JAMES MADISON 266 (R. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
7
Kenneth R. Harney, Eminent Domain Ruling Has Strong Repercussions, WASH.
POST, July 23, 2005, at F01.
8
See The Miers Blunder, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2005, at A14. This editorial in the
Wall Street Journal labeled the Kelo decision as an “evisceration of private property
rights.” Id.
9
See Ted Mann, Lawmakers to Review Eminent Domain Proposals, THE DAY, Sept. 28,
2005 (on file with author) (noting that Connecticut is among the twenty-five states
where state legislators have introduced bills to curb use of eminent domain); see also
William Murphy, Discussing Seizures of Private Land, NEWSDAY, Sept. 21, 2005, at A24
(explaining how the Kelo decision should not affect New York City’s seizure of private
land).
10
See Shannon P. Duffy, Suit Against Philadelphia to Test Reach of Kelo Decision, N.J.
L.J., Oct. 10, 2005, at 78 (reporting that a suit was instituted in Pennsylvania contending that a condemnation of land for use as a driveway for Federal Express does not
meet Kelo standards).
11
Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
L.J. 599, 614 (1949) [hereinafter Public Use Limitation]. In this note, the author concludes that:
The Supreme Court has repudiated the doctrine of public use.
Most state courts have arrived at the same conclusion, although rarely
with so much directness. Doubtless the doctrine will continue to be
evoked nostalgically in dicta and may even be employed authoritatively
in rare, atypical situations. Kinder hands, however, would accord it the
permanent interment in the digests that is so long overdue.
Id. at 614.
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New Jersey, and whether the dissent has invigorated a backlash that
may limit the government’s exercise of its eminent domain power in
the future.
I.

KELO GENERALLY

A. Background
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution permits
the government to take private property for public use, so long as
12
reasonable compensation is paid. The Takings Clause simply states:
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just
13
compensation.” The right of a sovereign to take private property
14
can trace its roots at least as far back as formalized government, but
the public use limitation has been applied differently over the years.
Eminent domain was rarely invoked in the early years of the United
States because there was plenty of land and natural resources. It was
employed for only two reasons: the construction of roads and the operation of gristmills.
In the early nineteenth century the public use limitation was
read liberally and applied broadly in order to justify a taking for the
15
public “good” or as a public “necessity.” At that time, many states
allowed gristmill owners to construct dams in rivers in order to generate power for the mill. The laws provided that the property owners
whose lands flooded as a result of the dam would be compensated for
the loss. Although the mill was privately owned, the condemnation
16
was justified as a “great advantage to the public.”
As time passed, the mill acts were deemed to cover unintended
applications that had minimal public impact, such as manufacturing
12

U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states in full:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

Id.
13

Id.
Public Use Limitation, supra note 11, at 600 n.5.
15
Id. at 601. See also Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1977).
16
Berger, supra note 15, at 206.
14
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17

facilities. Some courts frowned upon the broad application of the
mill acts. With the advent of the railroad, courts became increasingly
concerned that “the public benefit standard would allow virtually
18
Accordunlimited invasions into the rights of private property.”
ingly, the courts imposed a narrower, more literal test: a taking could
be justified only if the property taken was actually used by the public
19
or if the public had the right to use the taken property.
This narrower standard flourished in the mid-eighteen hundreds. However, in the latter half of the century, the proclivity of
state and federal governments to employ eminent domain grew exponentially due to the needs of industrialized America and the ex20
pansion into the western United States. Condemnation was neces21
sary for construction of railroads in the West, designation of
22
23
battleground memorials, irrigation of arid lands, and protection of
24
mining rights, among other things. At that time, some states gradually returned to the broader rule, which permitted government to
take land if a public benefit—as opposed to actual use by the public—existed. The result was a hodge-podge of different rulings
throughout the states.
Surprisingly, it was not until the waning years of the eighteenth
century that the Supreme Court began to exercise its authority to re25
view takings.
In 1897, the Fifth Amendment was applied to the
States by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend26
ment. With the Supreme Court weighing in, the interests of progress and the western expansion prevailed. The use-by-the-public test
27
was abandoned, and the public purpose or benefit test was rein17

Public Use Limitation, supra note 11, at 604.
Berger, supra note 15, at 208.
19
Id.
20
Public Use Limitation, supra note 11, at 601; see also Kelo v. City of New London,
125 S. Ct. 2655, 2662 (2005); S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., 710 N.E.2d 896,
900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
21
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
22
United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
23
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896); Clark v. Nash, 198
U.S. 361 (1905).
24
Improvement Co. v. Slack, 100 U.S. 648 (1880).
25
S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth., 710 N.E.2d at 900; Public Use Limitation, supra note 11, at
599–600; see also Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906);
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2681 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the “use of the eminent
domain power was sparse at the time of the founding”).
26
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–34
(1897); Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658 n.1; see also S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth., 710 N.E.2d at 899.
27
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 (noting that “when this Court began applying the Fifth
Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader
18
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stated. One court called the public purpose standard a “more natural
28
interpretation” of the Takings Clause. Under the public purpose
test, the government may take property if it has shown a legitimate
governmental reason or advantage. In determining what constitutes
a valid public benefit or purpose, the courts will ordinarily defer to
the will of the legislature. As a result, the list of public uses has grown
significantly. Hence, in the early twentieth century, most courts
abandoned the “actual use” standard because it was too difficult to
29
30
define, and adopted the public purpose test instead.
Despite the broader public purpose view, the case law continued
to cling to certain rubrics regarding the restrictions on the use of
eminent domain. Generally, the government could neither condemn
31
private property to give it to another private individual, nor could it
and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose’”).
Underlying the majority and dissenting opinions, there is a basic disagreement
about the extent to which the Constitution protects private property interests from
government interference. The Takings Clause may be a mere twelve words, but to
Justice O’Connor “[i]t is against all reason and justice” for a people to entrust a legislature with the power to “take[] property from A and give[] it to B.” Id. at 2671
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798)). Justice Thomas believes that “the law of the land . . . postpone[s] even public necessity to the
sacred and inviolable rights of private property.” Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 134–35
(1765)).
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, sees the legal precedent in the historical context of the takings clause much differently. He notes that as far back as colonial
times, the state legislature enacted, and courts upheld, economic development takings in the so-called mill acts. Id. at 2681. These laws allowed operators of gristmills
to dam rivers in order to produce power for mill operations, such as grinding corn.
If the uplands flooded as a result of the damming, then just compensation was required. To Justice Stevens, a taking is permitted if there is a public benefit. Id. at
2662 n.8. See generally Berger, supra note 15, at 204 (noting that these opposing views
are both legitimate because “the origin of the Public Use requirement in America is
perhaps more obscure” and that the “rival” requirement of actual use (narrow view)
or public benefit (liberal view) have conflicted for centuries); Nathan Alexander
Sales, Note, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment’s “Public Use” Requirement,
49 DUKE L.J. 339, 340–41 (1999) (noting that although legal scholars tend to side
with Stevens’s view, the real issue is whether private property rights outweigh the
general welfare of the public at large).
28
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S.
112, 158–64 (1896)).
29
See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (observing the inadequacy of use-by-the-general-public as a universal test and applying
the public purpose test); see also 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.2 (2002); see generally County of Essex v. Hindenlang, 114 A.2d 461, 466 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1955).
30
See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662; see also Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S.
112, 158–64 (1896).
31
See Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896); Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984); Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669; S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth., 710
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take property where the taking favored a “private party, with only in32
cidental or pretextual public benefits.” With these caveats, the law
remained generally the same for the next century. Then came Kelo.
In Kelo, the issue was whether privately owned land could be taken
and conveyed to another private party for economic development
purposes where the only public benefits—revitalization of a
33
neighborhood—were intangible.
B. Kelo v. City of New London
New London, Connecticut was in an economic freefall in the
early 1990s because the Navy closed its undersea warfare center located at Fort Trumbull. Unemployment in New London was twice
34
the rate of the rest of the state. In 1990, Connecticut declared New
35
London to be a distressed city. In January 1998, New London reactivated the New London Development Corporation to spur economic
36
development within the Fort Trumbull area. About a year later, a
pharmaceutical company committed to constructing a $300 million
research facility immediately adjacent to the Fort Trumbull area to
take advantage of the tax incentives available to distressed cities. The
development district included 115 privately owned properties and
37
thirty-two acres previously occupied by the naval facility. The development plan included a waterfront conference hotel, pedestrian river
N.E.2d at 901 (voiding a taking because it “involve[d] the taking of property from
one private party and the immediate transfer to another private party, whose interest
in the property [was] solely to earn greater profit”).
32
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). One New Jersey court has
stated the rule to mean if “a condemnation is commenced for an apparently valid
public purpose, but the real purpose is otherwise, the condemnation may be set
aside.” Casino Reinvestment. Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 103 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div.1998); see also Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Land with Improvements, 521
A.2d 227 (Del. 1986); Atlantic City v. Cynwyd Invs., 689 A.2d 712, 721 (N.J. 1997).
33
As Justice Stevens acknowledged:
Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has
long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A
for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even
though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally
clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future “use by the public” is the purpose of the taking. . . . Neither of these propositions, however, determines the disposition of this
case.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
34
Id. at 2658.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 2659. The City of New London and the New London Development Corporation are collectively referred to as “city” to the extent possible.
37
Id.
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walk, eighty new residences, and a Coast Guard museum. Additionally, the plan called for development of 90,000 square feet of office
and research space. Finally, the marina area would be renovated and
a 2.4-acre site, known as parcel 4A, would be used to support the ad38
jacent state park. The Development Corporation successfully negotiated with all property owners except fifteen private homeowners. In
November 2000, the New London Development Corporation instituted condemnation proceedings to acquire the remaining fifteen
39
lots.
The affected homeowners form a very sympathetic group.
Susette Kelo had substantially renovated her pink house, which she
40
41
purchased in 1997. She “prize[d]” her beautiful waterfront views.
Another petitioner, Wilhemena Dery, was born in her Fort Trumbull
42
home in 1918, and had lived there her entire life. Her husband had
lived in the house since their marriage sixty years ago, and their son
43
lived in the house next door. In all, the nine petitioners owned fifteen properties in the redevelopment area—four in the section des44
ignated for office and research and eleven in the park support area.
There was no allegation that the properties were blighted or otherwise in poor condition. The properties were to be leased to a developer for one dollar per year if the developer agreed to develop the
45
The rationale for conline according to the development plan.
demnation was that the homeowners’ lots were located within the redevelopment sector, which would act “as a catalyst to the area’s [eco46
nomic] rejuvenation.”
Responding to the condemnation suit, the landowners claimed
that the takings violated the public use restriction of the Fifth
Amendment. More particularly, they argued that the city was confiscating their property to give it to another private citizen and that
these takings were not a “‘public’ [use] for purposes of the Fifth

38

Id. The term “park support” drew criticism from the dissent. Justice
O’Connor remarked that “Parcel 4A is slated, mysteriously, for ‘park support’” and
that “[a]t oral argument, [the city] conceded the vagueness of this proposed use
. . . .” Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
39
Id. at 2660.
40
Id.
41
Id. Ms. Kelo prefers to refer to her house as a cottage. See The Cottage Coalition, http://www.cottagecoalition.org (last visited Aug. 11, 2006).
42
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672.
43
Id. at 2660.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 2660 n.4.
46
Id. at 2659.
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47

Amendment.”
After a seven-day trial dominated by testimony of experts, including planners and urbanologists, the trial court issued a mixed deci48
sion. The court prohibited the taking of the properties that were
within the park support area, but allowed condemnation of lots
49
within the office and research section.
On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut upheld the city’s right to condemn all the
50
properties. The court, relying on a Connecticut statute that authorized the use of eminent domain to acquire land for an economic development project, held that such a taking for economic develop51
In
ment purposes is a “public use” and in the “public interest.”
essence, the Supreme Court of Connecticut found that the taking was
reasonably necessary to achieve the city’s intended public use—
52
revitalization of the Fort Trumbull area. The state’s highest court
held the use of the land designated for park support was “sufficiently
53
definite” to satisfy the Takings Clause.
54
Interestingly, three justices disagreed.
They opined that a
heightened standard of judicial scrutiny was necessary to justify tak55
ings for economic development purposes. These justices found that
the plan was intended to serve a valid public use, but the takings in
this instance were unconstitutional because the city had failed to
show by “clear and convincing evidence” that the economic benefits
56
of the development plan were achievable.
C. United States Supreme Court Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court of the United States granted the homeowners’ petition for a writ of certiorari. Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, acknowledged that a sovereign may neither take the property of one person for the sole purpose of transferring it to another,
nor may it take property under the pretext of a public purpose when

47

Id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super LEXIS 789 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).
49
Id. at 341.
50
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004).
51
Id. at 512.
52
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672.
53
Id. at 2661 (citing Kelo, 843 A.2d at 574).
54
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 574 (Zarella, J., joined by Sullivan, C.J., and Katz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55
Id. at 587–92.
56
Id. at 578, 588.
48
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57

the actual purpose is to bestow a private benefit. However, the majority upheld the taking because it was part of a statutory scheme
which promoted a social good. In applying the facts in Kelo to the
case law, Justice Stevens found that the takings were part of a “carefully considered development plan” to revitalize the economy of New
58
London. In such an instance, the Court, following judicial precedent, deferred to the state legislature’s determination of what constitutes the public good rather than substitute its own judgment.
To support that conclusion, the majority traced the evolution of
the meaning of the term “public use” through its prior rulings. Its
inquiry commenced with the case of Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Brad59
ley, where the Court abandoned the use-by-the-public test in favor of
60
a “more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’”
Justice Stevens explained that Fallbrook was in lockstep with the states,
which at the time had “either circumvented the ‘use by public test’
61
when necessary or abandoned it completely.”
57

Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661–62.
Id. at 2661 (internal citations omitted).
59
164 U.S. 112 (1896). In Fallbrook, the California legislature enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme to irrigate arid lands. Id. at 151–52. The Fallbrook Irrigation District is a legislatively created district to bring water to arid lands so that they
could be cultivated. Id. at 151. It assessed all property holders within the irrigation
district a fee based upon its costs to develop and provide water to the arid properties.
Id. at 153. Bradley’s property was included within the District, but Bradley refused to
pay the assessment because she contended that she received no benefit from the irrigation. Id. at 156. Pursuant to the statutory scheme, Fallbrook had the right to levy
upon Bradley’s land due to non-payment. Id. at 159. Accordingly, Fallbrook followed the statutory process and awarded a deed to a third party. Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at
159. Bradley sued to enjoin the levy arguing that it was tantamount to a taking and
that there was no public use justifying the same. Id. at 159. She argued that the irrigation of arid land did not benefit the public but only served other private landowners who could not cultivate their lands, and as a result, the taking did not meet the
used-by-the-public test. Id. at 156.
On that issue, the Court opined that resolution depended upon whether the irrigation district fit within the meaning of public use. Id. at 158–59. The Court held
that whether a public use exists largely depends upon the facts and circumstances
surrounding the particular matter. Id. at 160. The Court found “to irrigate [land]
and thus to bring into possible cultivation” large masses of land is a ‘public purpose’
and a ‘matter of public interest.’” Id. at 161. Accordingly, Fallbrook set a precedent
for many irrigation districts which aimed to cultivate about three million acres in the
emerging West. The fact that only a limited number of landowners benefited from
the irrigation was not “fatal” to the statutory scheme. Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 161.
Without substantial explanation, Justice Peckham invoked the words “public use,”
“public purpose,” and “public interest” interchangeably, obviously assenting to a
broad interpretation of public use. Id. at 161–62.
60
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662.
61
Id. at 2662 n.8; see generally Philip Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of
Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 619–24 (1940).
58
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The death knell for the use-by-the-public test sounded several
years later in a case where mining interests were at stake. In Strickley
62
v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., land was condemned to accommo63
date an aerial bucket owned by a mining company.
In order to
connect the mining operations at the mountaintop to a rail depot in
64
the valley, the line for the bucket had to cross privately owned land.
Since Utah statutes authorized the use of eminent domain for the
65
construction of “tramways . . . to facilitate . . . the working of mines,”
and the Utah Supreme Court upheld the same as a valid public purpose, Justice Holmes concluded that the Constitution “does not re66
quire us to say that they are wrong.” He emphasized that the use-by67
the-public test was inadequate, and as long as the legislature of the
state expressed a reasonable public purpose to support the taking,
68
then the taking was consistent with the Fifth Amendment. Since
that time, the narrow use-by-the-public test has been “consistently re69
jected” by the Court.
For the next fifty years after Strickley, the law of eminent domain
remained relatively consistent, despite two world wars and the Great
Depression. In 1954, however, the Court expanded the government’s
70
power again. In Berman v. Parker, the Court confronted two issues:
(1) whether Congress could condemn an entire area, rather than a
62

200 U.S. 527 (1906).
Id. at 529.
64
The facts of the case were undisputed. The mining company constructed “an
aerial bucket line” to transport ore about two miles down from a mountain top to a
railroad depot. Id. at 529. Strickley had a placer mine interest in land which the aerial line traversed. Id. at 529–30. At the time of condemnation, the mining company
could not locate Strickley to negotiate an easement, so it paid monies into court. Id.
at 530. Strickley did not object during construction of the aerial bucket line. Id.
65
Strickley, 200 U.S. at 530.
66
Id. at 531. In a later case, Justice Holmes said the decision of the legislature “is
entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility.” Old Dominion
Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925).
67
Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531. Strickley can be factually distinguished from Kelo. In
Strickley, the taking involved air rights over a small swatch of property. Id. at 529–30.
Although the case does not precisely state as much, there was no substantial interference with Strickley’s use of his land. Kelo, however, involved a taking that removed
people from their homes. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although
Thomas’s dissent in Kelo does limit the breadth of the ruling in Strickley, it does not
factually distinguish it. See id. at 2683–84 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68
Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531–32.
69
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663; see also William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent
Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972). Professor Stoebuck muses: “Perhaps the public
use doctrine still has enough vitality that someone might argue it as an objection to
an excess condemnation, but with hardly an expectation of success.” Id. at 590 (emphasis added).
70
48 U.S. 26 (1954).
63
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specific lot, because the area was blighted; and (2) whether Congress
could authorize conveyance of the disgorged property to another pri71
In Berman, there was expert testivate party for redevelopment.
mony that 64.3% of the houses within the redevelopment area were
beyond repair, that 82.2% had no wash basins, and that 83.8% lacked
72
heat. Berman owned a department store within the redevelopment
73
area. He objected to the condemnation of his property because it
was commercial, whereas the major object of the law was to redevelop
74
residential property. He also argued that his store was in a state of
75
good repair and not in need of redevelopment. Berman argued
that no public purpose was served by the condemnation of his property, especially since the findings of blight exclusively related to resi76
dential property.
The Court disagreed. Justice Douglas analyzed the case in terms
of police powers, and found that it was “fruitless” to define the reach
77
or “outer limits” of police power. Justice Douglas reasoned that the
legislature, not the judiciary, properly determines the public interest
71

Id.
The federal legislation did not define what constitutes a slum or a blighted
area, but it did set forth the meaning of substandard housing. Id. at 28 n.1. There
are two major issues when condemning blighted zones: (1) the taking of property
from one private person and giving it to another; and (2) redevelopment that is not
used by the public, like a park or road. Some states, recognizing the issues, specifically provide for use of condemnation to deal with blight. In 1947, some seven years
before the Berman decision, New Jersey adopted a new constitution which declared
that redevelopment of blighted areas is a “public purpose and public use.” N.J.
CONST. art. VIII, § 3. The section states in full:
Blighted areas, clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment; tax exemption of improvements; use, ownership, management
and control of improvements:
(1) The clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment
of blighted areas shall be a public purpose and public use, for
which private property may be taken or acquired. Municipal,
public or private corporations may be authorized by law to undertake such clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment; and improvements made for these purposes and uses,
or for any of them, may be exempted from taxation, in whole or
in part, for a limited period of time during which the profits of
and dividends payable by any private corporation enjoying such
tax exemption shall be limited by law. The conditions of use,
ownership, management and control of such improvements
shall be regulated by law.
Id.
73
Berman, 348 U.S. at 31.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 32.
72
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78

and is the guardian of public needs. The Justice noted that this
principle does not have any exceptions, including whether the exer79
cise of the power of eminent domain may be employed. In applying
that standard, Justice Douglas noted that Congress decided to attack
“blighted parts of the community on an area rather than on a struc80
Since there were rational planning and
ture-by-structure basis.”
health principles supporting the legislative plan, the Court would not
81
second-guess Congress.
Justice Stevens seized upon Berman as the underpinning of the
82
Kelo decision. He reasoned that the legislature declared a legitimate
public purpose and articulated a comprehensive plan of redevelopment. Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded, as in Berman, that the
83
exercise of the power of eminent domain was appropriate. In other
words, the use of condemnation is “coterminous” with the exercise of
84
police powers. Similarly to Berman, the Kelo court found that redevelopment need not be on a piecemeal basis, and the Court would
defer to the legislature with regard to whether the area must be
85
planned as a whole rather than on a parcel-by-parcel approach. To
the majority, the argument that property cannot be taken in order to
86
Justice Stevens enconvey it to another private party is flawed.
dorsed Justice Douglas’s rationale in Berman that Congress determines the public good and may rightfully conclude that “the public
end may be . . . better served through an agency of private enter87
prise.”
In addition to Berman, Justice Stevens relied upon Hawaii Hous88
89
ing Authority v. Midkiff for support.
Justice Stevens opined that
Midkiff stood for the proposition that eminent domain may be em78

Id.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. Justice Douglas declared that “[o]nce the object is
within the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for
Congress to determine.” Id. at 34.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 34–35. Relying on the expert testimony that the entire area needed redesigning in order to assure diversification of uses, Justice Douglas found that “diversification in future use is . . . within congressional power.” Id. at 35.
82
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2673 (2005).
83
Id. at 2663. Justice Stevens noted that when reviewing whether a public purpose exists, the Court has “defined that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding
policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.” Id.
84
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
85
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
86
Id. at 2676.
87
Id. at 2666 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1954)).
88
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
89
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674.
79
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90

ployed liberally as a tool to correct a social wrong. Midkiff presented
very extraordinary facts. The issue was whether the Public Use Clause
prohibited the State of Hawaii from taking title in real property from
lessors and transferring it to lessees in order to eliminate the concen91
tration of fee simple ownership in the State. Factually, the state and
federal government owned forty-nine percent of the land within Hawaii, and another forty-seven percent was owned by seventy-two pri92
vate landowners. The legislature found that such concentration of
ownership skewed the real estate market and inflated prices to the
93
detriment of the public. Accordingly, the legislature enacted a detailed process that required, under certain circumstances, that properties of lessors be expropriated, and that the lessees take fee simple
94
title. The lessors owned the property on which lessees constructed
their dwellings. The lessors would not convey the land to the homeowners, effectively preventing working class persons from acquiring
real property. As in Fallbrook and Berman, there was a comprehensive
statutory scheme detailing the reasons for condemnation and a specific statutory scheme to implement the statute. In addition, the statute had a clear public purpose: to correct the manipulation of the
95
real estate prices by an oligopoly.
Justice O’Connor, writing for the unanimous Midkiff Court,
found that the public purpose test was satisfied because the statute
corrected “the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligop96
oly” similar to laws enacted by the original colonies. In dicta, she
further noted that “one person’s property may not be taken for the
benefit of another private person without a justifying public pur97
pose,” but in her view, the purpose of the Hawaii statute was sufficient to warrant condemnation.
In Kelo, Justice Stevens cites Midkiff for the proposition that “[i]t
is only the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics,” that matters in

90

Id. at 2661.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232–33.
92
Id. The concentration of ownership was the remnant of a “feudal land tenure
system” that existed for centuries prior to statehood. Id. at 232.
93
Id. at 244.
94
Id. at 233–34.
95
Compare Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896) (California
statute establishing irrigation district), with Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)
(federal statute creating redevelopment area), and Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (Hawaii law
ordaining housing authority).
96
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241–42. In fact, dismantling oligopolies is a “classic exercise” of police power according to Justice O’Connor. Id. at 242.
97
Id. at 241 (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)).
91

SHERIDANFINAL2

320

1/22/2007 11:32:44 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:307

98

determining public use, and because breaking up a real estate oligopoly is a bona fide public purpose, then condemnation is an appropriate tool to achieve the legislative purpose. Similarly in Kelo,
because economic development is a permissible public purpose, the
condemnation was authorized. In conclusion, Justice Stevens found
nothing inconsistent in allowing government to condemn property
for the purpose of economic development so long as it is pursuant to
“a comprehensive redevelopment plan” which, by its very terms, contemplates that “the legal rights of all interested parties” would be
99
considered.
The majority found no reason to impose a new standard to deal
with economic development takings. In fact, the Court rebuffed two
tests proffered by petitioners: a bright line test and a heightened
scrutiny test. The bright line test simply prohibits property from being taken for economic development purposes, while the heightened
scrutiny test requires that the condemning authority show with rea100
The majority
sonable certainty that the public benefit will occur.
cast aside a bright line test because there is “no principled way of dis101
tinguishing economic development from [other takings].”
The
majority also dismissed the heightened level of review (reasonable
certainty that public benefits would in fact occur), believing that it
would impede redevelopment because “judicial approval” would be
102
To the majorpostponed until success of a project becomes likely.
ity, the only recourse for the petitioners and future property owners
evicted for economic development purposes lies with the legislature,
which has the authority to curtail the use of eminent domain by stat103
ute.
D. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion states that a taking may be
justified so long as there is a rational relationship between the public
purpose and the property seized. In other words, Justice Kennedy
argues that a taking should be upheld as consistent with the Public
Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment so long as it is rationally related

98
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (2005) (quoting Midkiff, 467
U.S. at 244).
99
Id. at 2668.
100
Id. at 2667–68.
101
Id. at 2665.
102
Id. at 2668.
103
Id. (stating that “nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power”).
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104

to the stated public purpose.
The Justice acknowledges that a taking should be struck down if it is clearly intended to favor a particular
private party over another, or only an incidental public benefit exists.
In those instances, Justice Kennedy would find that no rational relationship existed between the taking and the public use. To Justice
Kennedy, economic development taking should be subject to the
same test as economic regulations under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses: the rational relationship test. To him, this test
would protect against arbitrary governmental action.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion seemingly responded to the dissent of
three members of the Connecticut Supreme Court, who opined that
a higher scrutiny test should be applied to economic development
takings. According to their view, the government had the burden of
proving by “clear and convincing” evidence that a public benefit existed, which would be something more than an undocumented in105
tangible benefit. Justice Kennedy’s analysis rejects this higher level
106
of scrutiny. Comparing the standard of the dissenting Connecticut
justices to Justice Kennedy’s standard, the takings in Kelo would be
void in the former instance, but employing Justice Kennedy’s more
relaxed standard, the takings would be upheld.
E. Justice O’Connor’s Dissent
The dissenters, rallying to preserve private property rights, did
not mince words in their bitter criticism of the majority’s reasoning.
Justice O’Connor found that intangible or incidental public benefits
often associated with economic development, such as increased tax
revenues, more jobs, and improved aesthetics, are insufficient predi107
cates to justify condemnation. To say otherwise is to “wash out any
distinction between private and public use of property—and thereby
effectively to delete the words ‘for public use’ from the Takings
108
Quoting Alexander Hamilton
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”
and James Madison in her defense of private property rights, Justice
O’Connor declared that the public use requirement of the Fifth
109
Amendment imposes a basic limitation on the government. In her
104

Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 588 (Zarella, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
106
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107
Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor states in part that
“the trouble with economic development takings is that private benefit and incidental public benefit are . . . merged . . . .” Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
108
Id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
109
Id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Hamilton believed that one of the great
105
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view, private property rights prevail over eminent domain unless the
110
condemnation fits within one of three categories of takings.
The three categories of takings are harmonious with the Public
Use Clause. Two of the three areas are uncontroversial. First, the
sovereign may take private property for public ownership for such
111
things as roads.
Second, the sovereign may transfer private property from one person to another private party, so long as the property
is used by the public, such as with common carriers like railroads and
112
The
with public utilities like water, gas, and electric companies.
third category is novel: the sovereign may take private property if “the
extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property in113
flict[s] affirmative harm on society.” Berman and Midkiff fall within
this third category. In Berman, the harm was blight resulting from
“extreme poverty,” and in Midkiff it was an oligopoly emanating from
the “extreme wealth” of a few to the detriment of the public at
114
large.
Having established the extraordinary-harm-to-the-public standard, Justice O’Connor viewed the broad language in Berman and
115
Midkiff as “errant.”
She declared that the language, which states
that the “public use requirement is coterminous with the scope of a
116
sovereign’s police powers,” was unnecessary to decide those cases.
She explained that the language was not “put to a constitutional test,”
and Kelo demonstrated why the “police power and ‘public use’ cannot
117
In short, Justice O’Connor’s analysis distinalways be equated.”
guished Berman and Midkiff on the extraordinary-harm-to-the-public
theory and limited them by declaring some of the key language to be

aims of government is to secure property of citizens. Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Similarly, Madison wrote a “just government” is one “which impartially secures to
every man, whatever is his own.” Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (quoting James Madison,
Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266
(R. Rutland et al. eds., 1983)).
110
Id. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
111
Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
112
Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
113
Id. at 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
114
Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor’s social harm standard is
novel. There does not appear to be a case or legal scholar who has analyzed Berman
or Midkiff in such a fashion prior to this decision.
115
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor authored
the majority opinion in Midkiff. The recharacterization of the language of that case
as “errant” suggests that Justice O’Connor has reconsidered her position with regard
to private property rights and the government’s ability to disgorge them.
116
Id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
117
Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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118

“errant” and “unnecessary.”
In short, according to Justice
O’Connor, economic development takings, without a showing of extraordinary harm, cannot withstand constitutional protection afforded property owners.
F.

Justice Thomas’s Dissent

Where Justice O’Connor attempted to distinguish the case law
upon which the majority relied, Justice Thomas concluded that the
case law should be reconsidered. He recommended that the Public
Use Clause cases be revisited and that the Court return to the standard “that the government may take property only if it actually uses
119
or gives the public a legal right to use the property.” He viewed the
public use phrase as an expressly enumerated liberty which limits the
120
authority of government over the individual.
This liberty is on par
with other individual rights secured by the Fifth Amendment (e.g.,
double jeopardy, the right against self-incrimination, and due process
of law). As such, Justice Thomas argued that the Court should not
construe “public use” in a manner that undermines private property
rights by interpreting the clause broadly. Accordingly, Justice Tho118

Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Revisiting the early case law is appropriate
in Justice Thomas’s view because prior holdings could have been more narrowly
drawn in a manner consistent with the used-by-the-public test. For example, regarding the Supreme Court decision in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112
(1896) (fitting within the public purpose test (to cultivate arid lands)), Justice Thomas argued for the used-by-the-public test because “similarly situated members of the
public . . . had a right to use it.” Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Similarly, in Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906), which
upheld a taking to construct an aerial bucket, the use fell within the used-by-thepublic test because “the plaintiff [was] a carrier for itself and others” and therefore,
it was for a protected class. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2684 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531–32). In addition, Justice Thomas argued that the case establishing that the courts will defer to a legislature in determining public purpose
should have been decided on the used-by-the-public test. Id. at 2679 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). In United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896),
the issue was whether the government could condemn land for the purpose of building a battlefield memorial. Since the government was actually using the property,
there was no need for the Court to gratuitously add that “when the legislature has
declared the use or purpose to be a public one, its judgment will be respected by the
courts, unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.” Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at
2684 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (quoting Gettysburg Elec. Ry. 160 U.S. at 680).
Justice Thomas saw no alternative for cases like Berman and Midkiff but to reconsider them. He argued that the public purpose test, as enunciated in those cases,
“cannot be applied in a principled manner” because “no coherent principle limits
what could constitute a valid public use.” Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the cited precedent in Kelo obliterates an enumerated right of an individual against government interference. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
120
See id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119
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mas concluded that the Court should not defer to the legislative findings of what constitutes a “public use” when an enumerated right of
an individual is at stake because the courts have long been recognized by the public as the protectors of enumerated rights.
The Kelo decision has triggered a groundswell of opposition. In
one way, it is difficult to understand the outcry because the public has
long supported policies to rejuvenate our cities. On the other hand,
the thought that some bureaucrat may unilaterally dispossess homeowners of their property is rather unsettling. As a result, Congress
has conducted hearings on the decision. In early November 2005,
the House of Representatives passed a bill that prohibited the use of
federal funds on any projects where property is condemned for eco121
Hence, there may be a legislative
nomic development purposes.
solution. However, since condemnation is primarily a tool of state
and local government, it is worthwhile to review the laws and policies
in New Jersey, which is a microcosm of most of the industrialized
states.
II. KELO’S APPLICATION TO NEW JERSEY EMINENT DOMAIN
A. New Jersey Condemnation
New Jersey is often considered a bedroom community for those
working in New York City and Philadelphia. It is the most densely
122
populated state in the country, at 1165 persons per square mile.
The population is denser than India (914 persons per square mile)
123
and Japan (835 persons per square mile). According to some planners, New Jersey may be the “first fully built-out state in the coun124
try.”
It stands to reason that in New Jersey, as large tracts of land
capable of development dwindle, there will be increasing pressure to
redevelop the state’s deteriorated industrial areas. Developers are already interested, and cities including Newark, Bayonne, Camden,
Perth Amboy, and Asbury Park all have redevelopment areas. Developers often require the assistance of the government, through eminent domain, to assemble the land necessary for a redevelopment
project. Accordingly, the impact of the Kelo decision on New Jersey
will be almost immediate.

121
See Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong.
(2005).
122
Gertner, supra note 5, at 46, 52.
123
Id.
124
Id.
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B. New Jersey Law Pre-Kelo
Similar to the federal Constitution, the New Jersey Constitution
provides that “private property shall not be taken for public use with125
out just compensation.”
Unlike the United States Constitution,
New Jersey’s constitution specifically provides that the redevelopment
of blighted areas is “a public purpose and public use, for which pri126
vate property may be taken or acquired.” Prior to Kelo, the case law
liberally authorized the use of eminent domain. In fact, legal practice books did not even pay lip service to a narrow reading of public
use. The law was so well-settled that the practice series merely stated
“that full payment [must] be made for any private property taken for
127
a public purpose.”
In New Jersey, the right of the government to take property in
furtherance of the common good is beyond peradventure. In 1938,
New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Heher declared that the public
welfare was of “prime importance,” and the squelching of property
rights was “a negligible loss” considering the benefit to the commu128
nity. More specifically, he stated:
The state possesses the inherent authority—it antedates the constitution—to resort, in the building and expansion of its community life, to such measures as may be necessary to secure the essential common material and moral needs. The public welfare is of
prime importance; and the correlative restrictions upon individual rights—either of person or of property are incidents of the social order, considered a negligible loss compared with the resul125
N.J. CONST. art. I, § 20. Section 20 states: “Private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. Individuals or private corporations shall
not be authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation
first made to the owners.” Id.
126
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. This provision states that development of a blighted
area is a public use and public benefit:
The clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment of
blighted areas shall be a public purpose and public use, for which private property may be taken or acquired. Municipal, public or private
corporations may be authorized by law to undertake such clearance,
replanning, development or redevelopment; and improvements made
for these purposes and uses, or for any of them, may be exempted from
taxation, in whole or in part, for a limited period of time during which
the profits of and dividends payable by any private corporation enjoying such tax exemption shall be limited by law. The conditions of use,
ownership, management and control of such improvements shall be
regulated by law.
Id.
127
35 N.J. PRACTICE § 10.1 (1999) (emphasis added).
128
Mansfield & Swelt Inc. v. Town of W. Orange, 198 A. 225, 229 (N.J. 1938); Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 142 A.2d 837, 843 (N.J. 1958).
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tant advantages to the community as a whole.12 9

Obviously, in accord with this broad language, New Jersey adopted
130
the liberal view of what constitutes public use.
In light of this statement, New Jersey courts have not dwelled on
the different tests for defining public use. The last time it was at issue
131
was in the mid-1950s, in County of Essex v. Hindenlang.
In that matter, Judge Goldmann of the Appellate Division analyzed the narrow
132
and liberal tests for determining public use. Rejecting the narrow
view, he concluded that Essex County may condemn land to construct a parking lot next to county buildings because the use “is
clearly for the public benefit, to the public advantage, and has public
133
Interestingly, however, the decision did not require this
utility.”
analysis because the county was the developer of the lot. Hence, the
taking would have aptly fit within the narrower test.
In general terms, New Jersey eminent domain law can be summarized as follows: “[T]he individual must bow to the public welfare
134
and accept just compensation for his deprivation.” Public use is satisfied when the taking “tends to enlarge resources, increase the industrial energies and . . . manifestly contribute[s] to the general wel-

129

Mansfield & Swelt, 198 A. at 229; Wilson, 142 A.2d at 843.
See Wilson, 142 A.2d at 844–45; N.J. Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Agency v. Moses,
521 A.2d 1307, 1311 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Tide-Water Co. v. Coster, 18
N.J. Eq. 518 (1866).
131
114 A.2d 461 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955).
132
Judge Goldmann defined the narrow and liberal tests as:
Courts dealing with problems of eminent domain have generally
been reluctant to define the phrase “public use.” . . . [T]hey have recognized that the phrase “is incapable of a precise and comprehensive
definition of universal application.”
...
Judicial attempts to describe the subjects to which the expression
“public use” would apply have proceeded on two different theories.
One theory of “public use” limits its application to “use by the public”—public service or employment. . . .
Courts that take the broader and more liberal view in sustaining
public rights at the expense of property rights hold that “public use” is
synonymous with “public benefit,” “public advantage” or “public utility.”
Id. at 466–67 (citations omitted).
133
Id. at 468; see also Albright v. Sussex County Lake & Park Comm’n., 57 A. 398,
400 (N.J. 1904); State v. Totowa Lumber & Supply Co., 232 A.2d 655, 660 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (wherein the court permitted taking of land for an access
route which served a single private landowner).
134
See Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 142 A.2d 837, 843, 856–57 (N.J. 1958) (although property owners showed that their homes were in good repair, they were still
subject to declaration of blight).
130
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135

fare.” The reach of the government is so long that the Appellate
Division upheld the Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency’s taking
of a property for development of a shopping center on behalf of a
private developer on the basis that the shopping center was a sup136
porting facility to its statutory purpose of home construction.
In fact, it can be argued that in New Jersey the right of the sovereign to take property is upheld unless there is some showing of bad
faith. Generally, courts will not interfere with a decision to use emi137
nent domain in the absence of “fraud, bad faith or manifest abuse.”
138
For example, in Casino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Banin,
the Superior court set aside a condemnation by the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (“CRDA”) in furtherance of a casino
139
hotel project by Trump Properties. The condemned property abutted a 360-room hotel project, and the property was allegedly to be
used for parking and open space. But the agreement entered between the CRDA and Trump Properties was not so definite. The
court found that the agreement was ambiguous because Trump
Properties could, under certain circumstances, use the condemned
140
area for other purposes in the future. The court held that the only
reasonable conclusion was that the condemnation was to convey the
land to Trump Properties without a sound governmental reason.
The court held that a condemnation will be set aside if it is commenced “for an apparently valid public purpose, but the real purpose
141
is otherwise.”
Similarly, in Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehabilita142
tion, Judge Fuentes of the Superior court ruled that a taking may be
set aside if the municipality acted in bad faith or acted “with a furtive
143
design . . . or ill will.” In Borough of Essex Fells, the condemnation of
land for use as a public park was set aside when the real purpose was
shown to be an attempt by the condemnor to exclude development
135

Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d 86, 91 (N.J. 2002) (quoting JULIUS
L. SACKMAN, 2A NICHOLS’ THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.02 (3d ed. 1990)).
136
N.J. Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Agency v. Moses, 521 A.2d 1307, 1311 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1987) (dismissed on procedural grounds). There was no comprehensive development plan or finding of blight.
137
769 Assocs., 800 A.2d. at 90.
138
727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998).
139
Id. at 109.
140
Id. at 110.
141
Id. at 103; see also City of Atl. City v. Cynwyd Invs., 689 A.2d 712, 721 (N.J.
1997).
142
673 A.2d 856 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995).
143
Id. at 861; see also Essex County Improvement Auth. v. RAR Dev. Assocs., 733
A.2d 580, 585 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999).
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144

of a rehabilitation center.
More recently, in Mount Laurel v. Mipro Homes, L.L.C., the Appellate Division upheld Mount Laurel’s decision to condemn property to
145
thwart residential development. In that case, the township issued an
Open Space Recreation Plan and amended the plan to include a
16.3-acre parcel of land when it became known that the site plan for
the property had been altered from an assisted living facility that included units affordable to low- and moderate-income residents, to a
146
plan to construct twenty-three single-family residences. When good
faith negotiations to purchase the property proved unsuccessful, the
147
township filed a declaration of taking. The Appellate Division held
that the condemnation was for a valid purpose and found no “af148
firmative showing of fraud, bad faith or manifest abuse.”
The court, however, theorized that had Mount Laurel attempted
to condemn the property of Mipro’s predecessor, which planned an
assisted living facility, a finding of abuse of eminent domain power
149
might have been warranted.
New Jersey law appears to be more
liberal than federal law because Banin and Borough of Essex Fells appear to shift the burden of proof to the party opposing the condemnation and impose an affirmative duty on landowners to present
proof that the taking is not for a public use. This standard requires
that landowners show that the condemnor acted in bad faith.
The judiciary’s liberal view of condemnation also extends to the
New Jersey legislature. The state government has empowered numerous municipalities, counties, and independent authorities to
condemn property for economic development and redevelopment
reasons. The extent to which the legislature has authorized eminent
domain for economic development projects can best be illustrated
150
through the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (“LRHL”).
In New Jersey, any municipality may establish a redevelopment
151
agency pursuant to the LRHL.
There are currently eighteen redevelopment agencies. A redevelopment agency established pursuant
152
to the LRHL has condemnation powers.
To create a redevelop144

Borough of Essex Fells, 673 A.2d at 858.
878 A.2d 38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
146
Id. at 43.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 48–49 (quoting Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d 86, 90 (N.J.
2002) (quoting City of Trenton v. Lenzner, 109 A.2d 409, 413 (N.J. 1954)).
149
Id. at 49.
150
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-1 (West 2006).
151
Id. § 40A:12A-4(c). There are 518 municipalities in New Jersey.
152
Id. § 40A:12A-8(c).
145
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ment agency, the municipality must follow a statutory process which
includes an investigation and holding a public hearing on whether
153
the area is in need of redevelopment. In order to designate a redevelopment area, the LRHL requires that one of eight ill-defined reasons exist. These include, but are not limited to, a finding that the
generality of buildings are sub-standard, there has been an aban154
donment of land, or there has been lack of proper utilization.
Once the reason, or reasons, have been established through evidence, the municipality may draft a very detailed redevelopment
155
The development plan must address a number of issues, inplan.
cluding the displacement of residents. Development may ensue
thereafter, including the right to take property pursuant to the
156
plan.
Courts have routinely upheld a municipality’s action to create a
157
redevelopment area, so long as it is based on substantial evidence.
A finding of one of the eight reasons enumerated in the statute has
been ruled to constitute blight as stated in the New Jersey Constitu158
tion. As a result, redevelopment agencies have flourished throughout the state. The “relative affluence of the community is irrele159
vant,” and not every property within the redevelopment area needs
160
to be substandard for an area to qualify for redevelopment.
In
short, the application of the law is broad, and the standard justifying
the creation of a redevelopment agency is easily attainable.
In addition to redevelopment agencies and county improvement
161
authorities, there are other agencies that unexpectedly possess
condemnation powers for economic development purposes. For ex153
Id. § 40A:12A-6. More specifically, the statute requires: (a) resolution by the
municipality requiring a planning board to investigate whether redevelopment meets
statutory criteria; (b) a public hearing to be conducted; (c) notice to landowners; (d)
recommendation of delineation of redevelopment area by planning board; (e) municipality may adopt a recommendation based on substantive evidence; and (f) notice to be sent to impacted property owners. Id.
154
Id. § 40A:12A-5.
155
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-7 (West 2006).
156
Id. § 40A:12A-8(c).
157
Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 18 (N.J. 1971).
158
See N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
159
Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Borough of Princeton, 851 A.2d 685,
689 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), cert. denied, 182 N.J. 139 (2004) (condemnation
was not at issue).
160
Forbes v. Bd. of Trs. of the Twp. of S. Orange Vill., 712 A.2d 255, 262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
161
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:37A-69 (West 2006). County improvement authorities
may condemn land for benefit of the tourist industry and redevelopment of deteriorated areas.
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ample, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which was
conceived to operate bridges, tunnels, and ports, was granted author162
Simiity to exercise eminent domain for industrial development.
larly, the Delaware River Port Authority, whose original purpose was
to construct and operate certain bridges, was empowered in the late
1890s to undertake economic development projects and to utilize the
163
power of condemnation.
Additionally, the New Jersey Economic
Development Authority, which is primarily a financing entity for private companies, may condemn property with the local government’s
164
consent on behalf of those private interests. Finally, the New Jersey
Educational Facility Authority, which finances capital projects for
public and private institutions of higher education, may condemn
165
land, even on behalf of a private institution.
Unequivocally, the policy of the State of New Jersey has been to
use eminent domain as a means of fostering economic development
and redevelopment. In response to Kelo, however, New Jersey courts
and the state legislature may reverse this direction.

162

See id. §§ 32:1-35.72(c)–(d), 32:1-35.85. The Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey was conceived in the 1920s to operate ports and bridges. Later, it was authorized by New York and New Jersey to engage in industrial development to prevent
the erosion of the tax base and, if necessary, to use eminent domain to accomplish
that goal. Id.
163
See id. §§ 32:3-6, 13.23. The Delaware River Port Authority originally operated
some bridges between New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Later, it was statutorily enabled
to undertake economic development projects and exercise eminent domain for so
long as it served the “sound economic development of the Port District.” Id. § 32:313.23.
The Delaware River Basin Authority may “acquire by condemnation” property for
any authorized project. Id. § 32:11D-100. This includes cooperating with “private
agencies.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:11D-43 (West 2006). The Delaware River and Bay Authority is now permitted “to acquire (by gift, purchase or condemnation)” “economic
development projects . . . at its own initiative,” including an industrial park in Salem
County. Id. § 32:11E-1.
The Casino Reinvestment Development Authority was created in the early 1980s
and empowered to exercise eminent domain in Atlantic City because casino gaming
was authorized as a unique tool for urban development. Id. § 5:12-160, 182.
164
See id. § 34:1B-5(d). The New Jersey Economic Development Authority was
created in the 1950s and may exercise eminent domain for almost any type of project
with several caveats. The agency must obtain the consent of the municipality where
the property is located, and the municipality must not be receiving supplemental
school aid, or the municipality must have a population of more than 10,000, according to the most recent federal census. Id.
165
See id. §§ 18A:72A-1, 5(g). The Educational Facilities Authority, which largely
finances higher education facilities for public and private institutions, may acquire
land by condemnation that is reasonably necessary for its projects, including those
projects at private institutions.
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C. Post-Kelo: Case Law and Legislative Initiative
Since the Kelo decision, the tables have seemingly turned on the
condemnors. In the months following the Kelo decision, there have
been three trial court decisions concerning condemnation. These
decisions acknowledged the broad holding of Kelo, but found that the
condemnor manifestly abused its power, and tossed the condemnation actions. None of the decisions relied on Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo, but it is obvious that these recent cases break from a long
line of precedent that relentlessly ruled in favor of the government’s
power. Specifically, a taking by the New Jersey Department of Transportation was dismissed because it was based on “contradictory and
untrustworthy information,” which is startlingly contrary to a strong
166
In another matter, a
policy which favors condemnation for roads.
167
municipality was declared to have acted in bad faith.
Finally, the
condemnation of a trailer park was set aside because there was no
168
Hence, it appears that the trial
substantial evidence of blight.
courts, through findings of fact rather than groundbreaking laws,
have heard the public’s criticism of unfettered use of condemnation.
Although these cases may be a bellwether of what is to come, it remains to be seen what the policy of the appellate courts will be in the
future.
Similarly to the trial courts, the legislature has also reacted. On
June 8, 2006, New Jersey Assembly introduced Bill A-3257 (“the bill”).
It amends LRHL. It has been passed by the Assembly and is pending
before the Senate. To date, the Senate has not taken action on the
bill. The legislative purpose of the bill is “to ensure that the use of
169
eminent domain for redevelopment is an absolute last resort.” The
bill imposes objective criteria to determine whether “blight” exists.
Under this legislative proposal, in order to take a residential property, there must be evidence that the redevelopment area consists of
166

N.J. Dep’t of Transp. v. ADPP Enters., No. L-1426-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
June 13, 2005). This case flies in the face of case law because as recently as 2002, the
New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that a taking for a roadway “is undeniably
for a public use.” Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d 86, 91 (N.J. 2002)
(quoting N. Baptist Church v. Mayor & Common Council of the City of Orange, 22
A. 1004, 1004 (N.J. 1891)).
167
Order of Dismissal, Twp. of Bloomfield v. 110 Wash. St. Assocs., No. 2318-05
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005), available at http://www.njeminentdomain.com/
Order%20of%20Dismissal%20-%20Bloomfield.pdf.
168
LBK Assocs. v. Borough of Lodi, No. 8766-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 6,
2005),
available
at
http://www.njeminentdomain.com/44-3-1792%20LBK%
20ASSOCS.%20L.L.C.%20V.%20BOROUGH%20OF%20LODI%2C%20ET%20AL.
%3B%20ONE%20OTHE%20CAPTION.PDF.
169
Assemb. B. 3257, 212th Leg., (N.J. 2006).
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properties that are detrimental to the safety, health, and welfare of
the community. To prove such detriment there must be a showing of
“substantial” health or building code violations at the site or lack of
170
For commercial properties, the standard is
structural integrity.
more liberal. The objective evidence to warrant use of eminent domain may include “underutilization” of land or structures resulting in
171
property that is “stagnant and not fully productive.”
However, the legislature has carved out an exception to the objective criteria. That is, the statute permits that twenty percent of the
land mass within the redevelopment zone need not meet the objective tests. As a practical result, whether this bill constitutes any meaningful change in the use of eminent domain is subject to debate. For
example, the twenty percent carve-out would mean that most, if not
172
all, Kelo plaintiffs would remain subject to eminent domain. The bill
may not accomplish much with regard to commercial properties either. As discussed in Berman v. Parker above, the condemned parcel
was a department store. Under the bill, a commercial property may
be condemned if it is “underutilized.” Hence, if a municipality determines that a commercial building is not fully productive like the
department store in Berman, it may be condemned even if it is an ongoing concern.
As the legislature mulls over the bill, there are real-life situations
which question whether the bill will meet the legislative objective if
enacted. One such case is in Trenton, New Jersey, where recently, a
substantial developer wishes to convert an abandoned Champale fac173
tory site into eighty-four condominiums.
The rub is that the developer is requiring the city to acquire twelve parcels (or a portion of a
parcel) that abuts the Champale site. These parcels are small but the
174
In all likelihood these homes total less than
homes are well-kept.
twenty percent of the land mass in the redevelopment area. Hence,
the bill would probably offer no relief to the homeowners because of
the carve-out, were it to be enacted.
170

Id.
Id.
172
In Kelo, the 32-acre redevelopment area consisted of 115 privately owned
homes and Fort Trumbull Park (18 acres). That means that 115 residences were located on 14 acres (32 acres minus 18 acres). If A-3257 were applicable to Kelo, 20%
of the 32 acres, or 6.4 acres, need not meet the definition of blight. It stands to reason that since 115 parcels were located on 14 acres, the 15 Kelo plaintiffs occupied
less than 6.4 acres. Accordingly, under the terms of A-3257, the Kelo properties were
subject to condemnation.
173
Eva Loayza, Condo Plan Upsets Residents, TRENTON TIMES, October 19, 2006, at
A1.
174
Id.
171
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CONCLUSION
But the “development and direction of constitutional law also
175
shift . . . with the Court’s changing composition.”
Since two new
Justices, Roberts and Alito, have been appointed since the Kelo decision, their “readings of the Constitution” may “differ” from their
176
predecessors. Rather than settle an area of law, Kelo has sparked an
“ongoing dialogue over the exercise of and limitations” on the use of
eminent domain among legislators, political commentators, and the
177
citizenry.
In short, reconsideration could occur. In this area of constitutional law, the Roberts Court could quickly imprint its mark on the
relationship between the government and property owners. If this
occurs, the Roberts Court has alternatives. First, it may hold the line
and uphold Kelo. Second, it could adopt Justice O’Connor’s theory
that economic development takings violate the public use requirement unless some substantial harm to the public can be shown.
Third, the Court could adopt a new standard similar to that of the
dissenting justices of the Connecticut Supreme Court, wherein a
heightened level of scrutiny is imposed to justify economic development takings. Fourth, the Court could follow the enumerated rights
argument of Justice Thomas. Finally, the Roberts Court could find a
new balance, one that accommodates property rights and the redevelopment needs of worn-out Northeastern industrial areas of bygone
years, like New London, Connecticut.
In New Jersey, there are many cities and towns that require redevelopment. In the past, the courts have accommodated the need for
redevelopment by liberally permitting condemnation. On the other
hand, the number of homeowners, particularly in our urban areas,
has been steadily rising. Average folks are afraid that the government
may take their single most important investment for little reason.
The issue is currently front and center in both the courts and the legislature, and it deserves attention and re-evaluation in light of the
present circumstances.
Although the courts and the legislature are empowered to review
and revise the use of condemnation, the primary holders of the powers of eminent domain are the appointed and elected officials of redevelopment boards and authorities. These officials must carefully
consider their exercise of the eminent domain power, recognizing
175
1 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, Preface (5th Ed. W.W.
Norton & Co. 2003).
176
Id.
177
Id.
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the plight of homeowners who may be dispossessed by their actions.
Board members should ardently search for creative solutions that accommodate private property rights, hopefully without grinding redevelopment to a halt.

